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ABSTRACT 
 
The foundation of corporate law leads to separation and segregation of 
corporations from shareholders. The maxim of limited liability hauls shareholders 
out from puddle of corporate liability unless in extraordinary circumstances, advancing 
modern capital investment on corporate business until present day. Nevertheless, this 
expedient mechanism can be abusively applied and end up spoiling third parties’ interest. 
Therefore, this paper will comparatively provide and analyze the framework of ‘piercing 
the corporate veil doctrine’ from the perspectives of Japan, U.S. and Thailand as practical 
solutions for this crux.  
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บทคัดยอ 
 
การกอตัวขึ้นของกฎหมายบริษัทสงผลใหบริษัทมีสถานะและตัวตนแยกออกตางหากจาก   
ผูถือหุน สวนหลักการของการจํากัดความรับผิดนั้นก็สงผลใหผูถือหุนหลุดพนจากความรับผิดของ
บริษัท เวนแตในสถานการณที่พิเศษอยางยิ่งยวด หลักการเชนนี้ทําใหการลงทุนในรูปแบบของ
บริษัทแพรหลายมากขึ้นจนกระทั่งถึงปจจุบัน อยางไรก็ตาม มีการนําหลักการดังกลาวไปใชในทางที่
ผิดอยูบอยครั้ง ทําใหบุคคลภายนอกเสียผลประโยชนและไดรับความเสียหาย ดังนั้น บทความฉบับ
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น้ีจึงตองการนําเสนอและวิเคราะหเกี่ยวกับหลักการ “กระชากมานคลุมของบริษัท” ในมุมมองเชิง
เปรียบเทียบของทั้งประเทศญี่ปุน สหรัฐอเมริกา และไทย อันจะนําไปสูทางแกไขปญหาดังกลาว 
คําคนหา: หลักการเจาะมานคลุมของบริษัท, การไมคํานึงถึงสภาพนิติบุคคลของบริษทั, 
ความรับผิดจํากัดของผูถือหุน, ความรับผิดของบริษัท 
 
Introduction 
The firm establishment of legal principles indentified a corporation as a separate 
and distinct legal entity apart from its shareholders.  A corporation is obliged to be liable 
as a corporate entity, while liability of shareholders exist only when the business venture 
is got into “at risk” position by their shareholders’ conducts.1 The notable term “limited 
liability” is widely recognized as a mechanism of liability segregation. Limited Liability 
is initially purposed to enhance advancement of commerce and industry because 
shareholders, encouraged by this promotion, are able to invest their capital on companies 
with no worrisome concern about their private properties to corporate risks.2  
In the nineteenth century, this kind of business-investment-friendly principle was 
named as the most significant legal innovation.3 It is also plausible for the incentive value 
of limited shareholder liability to be “outweighed by the competing factor of basic 
fairness to parties dealing with the corporation.”4 However, this acumen doctrine has high 
tendency to become a double-edged sword if it is abusively applied to deceptive or 
fraudulent conducts in order to circumvent personal legal liability. Therefore, courts 
occupy discretion to enforce “piercing the corporate veil”5 as a suppressive measure to 
impose personal civil liability on the shareholders for the obligations of the corporation. 
A comparative examination on the “piercing the corporate veil doctrine” that appears in 
the law of Japan and U.S. will be asserted in this paper. The discussion about trend of this 
doctrine in Thai law, together with problematic issues regarding the codification of 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine in Thai Law will also be finally included.   
 
                                          
1David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371 (1980-1981). 
2Id. 
3Id. at 372.  
4Id. and  See   Labadie Coal Co. v. Black.  
5Id.  
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Fundamental Frame of Thai Corporate (or Company) Law 
A theory of corporate body has been commonly accepted and broadly engaged in 
Thai Law. The consideration of corporation existence, which is independent from its 
shareholders, is an essence of this doctrine, conceptualizing one of the “limited liability” 
of shareholders’ gambit.6 Due to this type of legal design, a corporation acquires its own 
legal entity, be able to possess or obtain ownership over assets, conduct any business 
transactions, file a law suit against other entities or, on the contrary, be subjected to legal 
liability offended by others. In addition, although there is substitution among 
shareholders, a corporation can still maintain its legal entity.7 
Under Thai law, a corporation becomes true separate legal entity from 
shareholders when the registration process is completed. The shareholders are not liable 
for any debt created by the corporate8 but they are limitedly liable only for any unpaid on 
the shares respectively held by them.9    
 Therefore, a corporation is a category of legal entity which is legally entitled to 
conduct commercial matters within the scope of the memorandum. It is capable of 
enjoying rights and being subject to obligations as a natural person, except the rights and 
obligations which may be only enjoyed or incurred by a natural person, according to 
Civil and Commercial Code section 68, 69, 70, 72(4).10  
By its nature, corporation cannot be established and run without the most 
significant composition, which are shareholders. This group of people do not indeed 
“own” a corporation but they are a corporate itself and hold a status as common owners 
of all corporate assets. In brief, each shareholder is the composition of a corporation11 
which makes a corporation becomes a legal entity or juristic person and holds any rights 
                                          
6WinitChai   SamnaoPhan, Khwam Rapphit Khong Phuthuehun Lae Kammakan Khong Borisat   
Phaitai Lakkan Mai Khamnueng Thueng Saphap Nitibukkhon Khong Borisat [The liability of shareholders 
and directors of corporations under piercing the corporate veil doctrine] 4 (Apr. 16, 1987) (LL.M. thesis, 
Thammasat University) (on file with Sanya Dharmmasak Library, Thammasat University). 
7Id. at 5.  
8Pramuan Kotmaiphaeng Lae Phanit [Civil and Commercial Code] § 1015.  
9Id. at § 1096. 
10SamnaoPhan, supra note 6 at 6. 
11PitiKun   ChiRaMongkhonPhaNit, Kan Mai Khamnueng Thueng Saphap Nitibukkhon [Piercing 
the  corporate veil doctrine] 4-6, available at www.lawthai.org/read/acharnpitikul16.doc.   
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and liability separately from its shareholders.12 A corporation is the de jure owner of 
assets, plus capable of carrying out as a creditor or debtor and ‘corporatively’ holds rights 
and liability.13  
According to corporate principles, any rights and liability arising from business 
operation directed by shareholders within the business scope of the corporation are 
authentically the rights and liability of the corporation itself. This leads to the 
consequence that the creditor of the corporate is entitled to enforce his compulsory 
performance against the corporate only from its assets, but not from personal assets of the 
shareholders.14 On the other hand, a personal creditor of the shareholders cannot enforce 
his compulsory performance against the assets of the corporation as well. In addition, 
creditors of the corporate are entitled to enforce their compulsory performance prior to 
personal creditors of shareholders.15  
From shareholders’ angle, they are not personally liable for the third party if a 
corporation establishes any debts. Additionally, in case of bankruptcy or insolvency, 
shareholders can still enjoy such protection of limited liability shield, guarding them from 
liability to the third party. This is because a corporation is a true legal debtor of the third 
party is the corporation, while shareholders themselves are held liable only for the 
amount of unpaid on the shares respectively held by them.16 The core of separate legal 
entity between shareholders and a corporation is also affirmed in Thai Civil and 
Commercial Coded, which stipulates that a shareholder cannot avail himself of a set-off 
against the corporate as to payments on shares.17 It is acknowledged that status of 
shareholders is precisely an investor and they obtain benefit by being paid with 
dividends.18  
 
 
 
                                          
12Id.  
13Id.  
14Id. 
15SamnaoPhan, supra note 10. 
16Pramuan Kotmaiphaeng Lae Phanit [Civil and Commercial Code] § 1096. 
17Id. at § 1119.  
18SamnaoPhan, supra note 15. 
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Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Gap Filler  
Isolation of legal entities between a corporation and shareholders has been 
conceptualized from time to time, together with structural legal design of limited liability 
of shareholders.19 Their significance and common acceptance come from the ground that 
limited liability enhances level of diversification for shareholders more effectively than 
imposing full liability on investors for corporate debt, since their exposition to the risk 
would be too overweigh to handle. Under this reasoning, diversification under dimness of 
unlimited liability wing tends to engage shareholders with increasing risk.20 
In addition, limited liability benefits the transfer of shares by allowing them to be 
moved more freely. Severe impairment of trading in public market may occur if 
shareholders had to encounter risk of exposing themselves to personal liability each time 
they trade shares. Moreover, in practical, when investors engage in more risk, they tend 
to be more careful on their agents or managers’ conducts; therefore, limited liability 
approach can manage monitoring cost more economically by diminishing the necessity to 
keep eyes on their managers.21 Besides, it stimulates reduction of budget spending on 
watching over other shareholders because if the wealth of other shareholders becomes 
greater, the plausibility that assets of any single shareholder will not be taken to satisfy a 
judgment will become higher.22 In addition, purposes of limited liability are to “limits the 
potential loss of a shareholder to the amount invested in the enterprise” and to “shift a 
substantial portion of the risk of business failure to creditors and away from 
shareholders.”23 However, these privileged consequences of limited liability are not 
highly be sensed in close corporations, where combination of status between shareholders 
and managers are commonly noticed. 
Nonetheless, there are two sides to every coin, including the coin named the strict 
limited liability rule. This functional legal design can occasionally be abusively brought 
in to play. Fraudulent conducts and evasion of legal liability can easily be pandered by 
                                          
19Id. at 8.  
20Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: Cases, Problems, and Case 
Studies 208 (2004). 
21Id.  
22Id. 
23Peter French, Parent Corporation Liability: an Evaluation of the Corporate Veil Piercing 
Doctrine and Its Application to the Toxic Tort Arena, 5 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 605, 607 (1992).   
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misappropriated use of limited liability concept. For example, a corporate entity may be 
held liable instead of shareholders themselves in contractual obligations, tortious acts or 
tax levy by “veiling” a corporate entity as a cover to hide their inner objectives24 which 
leads to problematic conditions for innocent third parties who have legal binding with 
those corporations.  
Illustratively, according to most corporate statutes, there are common articles 
which prohibit a corporation from lending money to its own director, in order to suppress 
conflict of interest. To circumvent this legal obstacle, such director may documentarily 
establish a new corporation where he solely becomes a major shareholder. As a 
consequence, he then is able to take advantage from this new corporate entity by 
borrowing money from the corporation that he still positions as a director under the entity 
of the new corporation as a borrower.25  
Another exemplification of untruthful exercising on handiness of limited liability 
or corporate entity is in the circumstance when a person has clinched the deal on an 
agreement binding him not to operate a business that will compete with his party’s 
business. In order to unlock the shackle, a new corporation can be formed which he 
become the major shareholder and the director so that he can operate any kind of business 
under the name of such corporation and lawfully gain beneficial profit.26 
Additionally, a corporate veil can also be used as a camouflage to escape from 
legal liability by being formed in the mode of undercapitalized corporation while capital 
level of such corporation will remain so little that any anticipated debts are implausible to 
be paid.  Then, after running the business under the shade of such deceit corporation, as a 
result, any creditors of the corporation (including the creditor by contract and tort) of that 
veiled corporate will suffer from insolvent status of the corporation and any of their debt 
repayment would be under very uncertain positions.  
Accordingly, realizing hazardous collateral impacts of corporate entity from the 
above problematic incidents, various jurisdictions have developed legal framework to 
install protective mechanism for innocent third party and restrain any conduct of business 
operations that show tendency of such abusive corporate veil. The framework has been 
                                          
24SamnaoPhan, supra note 6 at 8. 
25Id. at 9.  
26Id.  
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agreeably conceptualized to consider approval of an alleviative exception for limited 
liability of corporate entity doctrine by enforcing “piercing the corporate veil” or 
“disregarding the corporate entity” doctrines to fill up the legal gap of corporate entity 
regulation.27  
Once a veil of a corporation has been removed or pierced, it will become the 
identical person as a shareholder or the “alter ego”28 of a shareholder that leads to 
unification of legal entity of a corporation and its shareholders. It illustrates a non-
isolated status of legal entity between a corporation and its shareholders, in other words, 
this doctrine will deem that the business operation conducted by a corporation is the 
personal conduct of the shareholders or the director of such corporation. Therefore, the 
shareholders or directors of the corporation who truly manipulate behind the corporation 
and, in bad faith, take advantage from limited liability or separate legal entity of the 
corporation as a veil or commit fraudulent shall be unlimitedly liable together with the 
corporation for any debts that their corporation caused.29 
However, revocation or declination of limited liability and corporate legal entity are not 
the aim of piercing the corporate veil doctrine. It does not either dissolve a corporation; 
instead a corporation is able to remain its normal operation since this doctrine will focus 
on spotlighting to the insider or persons who are behind the curtain and should really be 
jointly liable to the third party with the corporation. It is, nevertheless, notable that the 
standing of this doctrinal measure is an exception of corporate entity concept for 
maintaining equity in specific circumstances. It will be effective only for a corporation 
that is unfaithfully run to estoppel a shareholder from raising any defense based on the 
limited liability rule. As a result, he has to be liable for the debt beyond the unpaid 
amount on the shares respectively held by him. In other words, the liability that he needs 
to bear will no longer be limited to the amount of his unpaid share.30  
 
 
 
                                          
27Barber, supra note 1.  
28the other self’, see Elizabeth S. Miller, Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner Liability 
Protection and Piercing the Veil of Texas Business Entities, 43-FALL Tex. J. Bus. L. 405, 406 (2009).  
29SamnaoPhan, supra note 6 at 11. 
30Id. at 12.  
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U.S. Law and Evolution of Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine 
The phrase “piercing the veil” was initially emitted since 1912 by Professor 
Maurice Wormser31 while the doctrine of limited liability began to formalize itself in 
U.S. long before, with no precise starting date.  An enactment of five variant statutes 
launched by Massachusetts parliament, from 1809 until 1830, legislating liability of 
shareholders seems to be the first milestone of expansive adoption on limited liability 
doctrine in United States. The judicial decision in case of Wood v. Dummer32 granted an 
approval for the principle of limited liability.33  
Reluctance of granting damages award against corporations could be sensed from 
U.S. judicial decisions in primal age of U.S. corporate law, and for this reason, the 
removal of corporate veil was scarcely expected34, in accordance with enormity and 
desirability of corporate being which devoted to financial and economic advantages.35 
The remarkable phrase quoted from Chief Justice Marshall even defined the corporation 
as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible an existing only in contemplation of law.”36 
Illustratively, according to 18th Century Mill Acts in New England, it prohibited owners 
of the land adjacent to mills from claiming damages if flood occurred on their properties 
because of water storage and discharge.  Although the primary purpose of statutes 
focused on compact-sized mills of the colonial era, mill factories that caused flood on 
wide area of land was later also under enforcement of this statutes37 
It is notable that an approach to the problematic issue of individual shareholder is 
mostly based on tracing through development of decisions that the courts made because 
there is no uniform binding rules. Moreover, purity of state-law domination was a legal 
nature of corporate establishment in the United States.38 This excessive variety urged 
Judge Cardozo to leave a statement of opinion in Berkey v. Third Ave. Railway Co. that 
                                          
31Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. Corp. L. 41, 43 (2000).  
3230 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824). 
33Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law-Liability of 
Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View, 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’L L. 187, 192 (1994-1995).  
34Id. 
35Peter French, supra note 23 at 605.  
36Id.  
37Alting, supra note 33 at 193.  
38French, supra note 35 at 609.  
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“the whole problem of the relations between parent and subsidiary corporations is one 
that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.”39 Moreover, Professor Elvin R. Latty 
from Duke Law School remarked that “what the formula comes down to, once shorn of 
verbiage about control, instrumentality, agency and corporate entity, is that liability is 
imposed to reach an equitable result.”40 
Although development of theories has been being acknowledgeable, the summary 
noted by Judge Sanborn brightened the passage in United States v. Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit Co. and provided descriptive approach to the problem: 
“If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a 
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general, and until sufficient reason 
to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the 
corporation as an association of persons.”41  
One of significant issues that should be notified is regarded to difference between 
piercing the veil and other issues in which owners of a corporate entity shall be 
personally held liable whatsoever without necessity to apply piercing mechanism.   For 
example, an individual obligation or tortuous acts may be occurred from individual 
conducts of a shareholder, instead of a corporate entity. He or she may induce a creditor 
that his or her actions are made individually, not on behalf of the corporation.42 Decisions 
on these cases will be made without applying the rules of piercing the corporate veil 
because an occurrence of individual liability is caused by the shareholder.  
Another theoretical evolution of piercing the veil doctrine was also remarked by 
Professor Adolf A. Berle of Columbia Law School, as an approach of “enterprise entity 
theory.”43 Professor Berle noticed that when a business was divided into various entities 
under supervision of the parent corporation, there was an inconsistency between 
economic reality and the legal organization. Therefore, he commented that the 
subsidiary’s debt is not the only liability which the parent should bear, but the parent 
                                          
39Alting supra note 37.  
40Id. 
41Id.  
42Id.  
43Id. at 194. 
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should also be liable for “all of the comprised assets available to a creditor of any of the 
enterprise’s corporations.”44 
The cases of New York taxi-cab are another source which can increase the 
illustrational level. Many cabs were paired and separately incorporated by each of their 
owners. The purpose is to enjoy the limitation of tortious liability arisen from the use of 
one cab and prevent the other “cab entity” from the flak of liability that may spread to 
them by incorporating in pairs. Therefore, only the lowest amount of third party 
insurance was the responsibility of the individual cabs, which often could not suffice 
obligations incurred. 45 
Rejection on Berle’s enterprise entity theory was made by the court in the case of 
Berkey v. Third Ave. Railway Co.46This case involved a parent corporation which was an 
owner of many subsidiary companies and controlled the operation of a railway 
transportation system in Manhattan. The court refrained from favoring the plaintiff, who 
caught one of the subsidiaries’ street cars and suffered from injury by negligence, by 
refusing to impose shareholder liability. In an alternate taxi-cab case, Walkovszky v. 
Carlton, a reference to Berle’s conception was made by the court. The conclusion was 
mostly narrated that extension of liability to the enterprise was plausible but not to the 
individual shareholders. However, it can be evidently sensed from the conclusion of the 
court that other factors such as undercapitalization and commingling of the corporation’s 
affairs had been focused and magnified more, rather than concentrating only on 
camouflaged separation of an enterprise by incorporating its own divisions.47   
There are other theoretical approaches which, instead of focusing on Professor 
Berle’s enterprise entity theory, take more glances at creditor’s view point. For example, 
Professor Wormser maintained that the lawful fictional status of a corporate separation is 
a privileged existence conferred by a state and it can be used only to reasonably and 
administratively serve legitimate purposes. Consequently, achievement of justice and 
prevention of shareholders from circumvent their legal liability should be the purposes of 
                                          
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
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the pierce. Moreover, it is his belief that because of an involvement of the complex 
relations, statutorization of these piercing rules could not be feasible.48 
A similar approach to Professor Wormser’s can be seen in California. Californian 
courts have more readiness than other states to disregard the entity. The courts 
concentrated on an application of a two-prong test, mostly known as the “alter ego” 
doctrine. The requirements of this test are comprised of: “(1) a unity of interest between 
the shareholders and their entity so that a separation of them no longer exists and (2) an 
inequitable result would follow if the acts objected to by the creditors were only treated 
as those of the corporation.” 49 
Another comparable approach is a theory asserted by Professor Powell. He made 
a suggestion on how to apply a three-prong test, widely known as the “instrumentality 
rule.”50 Adoption of this rule initially occurred in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.51 
Powell’s test depends upon: “(1) control or complete domination of an entity, (2) fraud or 
wrong committed by the use of this control or domination, and (3) injury or loss suffered 
by the plaintiff caused by the aforesaid act.” The original purpose of development of the 
test was for parent-subsidiary cases, but enforcement of the test to other cases, which 
were related to the domination of an entity, were also seen in various jurisdictions.52 
In order to decide when a corporate entity should be disregarded, Powel also 
provided a tabulation of eleven key-factors for determination. Addition of other factors 
can also be found. These additional factors can be extracted, by focusing on their mutual 
essences, into three factual formats. These are comprised of “situations of control or 
domination, undercapitalization, and commingling of assets or disregard of corporate 
                                          
48Id. at 195. 
49Id. and see note 28.  
50Id. 
51In this case, “…two insolvent individuals had, prior to the entry of the judgment against them in 
favor of Lowendahl, transferred substantially all of their assets to a newly-created corporation in exchange 
for forty-nine percent of its stock. The defendant B&O Railroad was the majority shareholder of such 
corporation and, when Lowendahl failed to recover against either the individual debtors or against the 
insolvent transferee corporation, he sued B&O on the theory that the corporate veil of the transferee 
corporation should be pierced to hold B&O liable...” See http://www.krendl.com/ CM/ Publications/ 
Piercing-Corporate-Veil.asp. 
52Alting supra  note 33 at 195. 
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formalities.”  Piercing the veil will become a concerned issue when these situational 
patterns are visible.53   
Another U.S. scholar, Davis H. Barber, possesses some similar conceptualization 
on an issue of piercing the corporate veil. He maintains that academically, enforcement of 
the piercing doctrine shall be raised upon publicly held and closely held of family 
corporations.54 Notwithstanding, a diagnosis of plenty of the case laws evidences that 
there is no case in which personal liability for the obligations was found at the 
shareholders of a corporation whose stock was publicly marketed or broadly negotiated. 
Therefore, “the piercing doctrine applies primarily to closely held corporations”.55 
Financing closely held corporations can be practically committed by one of two 
approaches. For the first one, the promoters are necessarily required. Their 
responsibilities are not only management of the corporation but also incorporation and 
contribution of their partial personal assets into the initial capital of the newly-born 
corporation, expecting the corporate veil to guard the remaining portions of their personal 
assets from business risky situation.56 The second approach requires partial contribution 
of initial capital from the promoter-managers including the raise of additional amounts 
from shareholders whose expectations are to refrain from managing the business. 
Therefore, if piercing of the veil becomes a consequence, personal liability will rest upon 
only shareholders who truly engaged in management of the corporation. Although 
reasonability can be sensed in this discriminative liability among shareholders in order to 
serve the rational purpose of limitation on shareholder liability, dicta57 in a couple of 
cases are the only legal supports of this rationality.58 
                                          
53Id. 
54Barber supra note 1.  
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Dicta are “the plural form of dictum.  A statement of opinion or belief considered authoritative 
because of the dignity of the person making it.  The term is generally used to describe a court's discussion 
of points or questions not raised by the record or its suggestion of rules not applicable in the case at 
bar.  Judicial dictum is an opinion by a court on a question that is not essential to its decision even though it 
may be directly involved.” See http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dicta.  
58Barber supra note 1.  
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Additional noteworthy point of piercing policy for closely held corporations is 
that U.S. courts have applied the corporate veil piercing in the conditions of parent-
subsidiary corporation situation, for example, when there is a contract between a plaintiff 
and the subsidiary and upon default, action of an attempt to impose the liability on parent 
corporation is apparent.  
However, since limited liability for shareholders was initially invented in state 
corporation law to serve the purpose of promoting commerce, therefore, U.S. courts have 
shown reluctance on piercing the corporate veil, even when incorporation was directly 
aimed for limiting the liability of corporate founders.59 Consequently, it might be implied 
that justification of applying piercing the corporate veil requires something more than 
inner intention of the shareholders to evade personal liability. However, accurate 
tabulation of such requirement has not been evidently established. Equitability becomes 
the destination of a party in the lawsuit who seek to disregard the corporate entity. 
Generally, the trial court considers various circumstantial factors in order to decide 
whether reasonability to pierce the veil is reachable.60  
While U.S. courts are allowed by a “totality of the circumstances” doctrine to 
make a decision on each case based on its own facts, such doctrine is not useful for 
entrepreneurs who are searching for firm guidelines about how to avoid personal liability. 
Notwithstanding, the piercing doctrine has been synchronized and analyzed into the 
enlisted version of elements that is applied by U.S. courts, especially when an issue 
whether to pierce the corporate veil becomes an important matter in the case to 
determine. A revelation extracted from the case law illustrates that one or more of the 
following factors were apparent in each piercing model:61 
 “(1) commingling of funds and other assets of the corporation with those of the 
individual shareholders (Corporation XYZ holds no separate bank account but deposits 
the receipts from its business transactions in the personal account of A, its sole 
shareholder); 
   (2) diversion of the corporation’s funds or assets to no corporate uses (to 
personal uses of the corporation’s shareholder); 
                                          
59Id. 
60Id. at 374. 
61Id. 
A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปที่4 ฉบับที่ 1 มกราคม – มิถุนายน 2556  | 50 
Praphrut Chatprapachai  Article  
   (3) failure to maintain the corporate formalities necessary for the issuance or 
subscription to the corporation’s stock, such as formal approval of the stock issue by an 
independent board of directors; 
   (4) an individual shareholder representing to persons outside the corporation 
that he or she is personally liable for the debts or other obligations of the corporation; 
   (5) failure to maintain corporate minutes or adequate corporate records; 
   (6) identical equitable ownership in two entities (Corporation A is owned by the 
same shareholders and in the same proportions as Corporation B); 
   (7) identity of the directors and officers of two entities who are responsible for 
supervision and management (a partnership or sole proprietorship and a corporation 
owned and managed by the same parties); 
   (8) failure to adequately capitalize a corporation for the reasonable risks of the 
corporate undertaking; 
   (9) absence of separately held corporate assets; 
   (10) use of a corporation as a mere shell or conduit to operate a single venture 
or some particular aspect of the business of an individual or another corporation; 
   (11) sole ownership of all the stock by one individual or members of a single 
family; 
   (12) use of the same office or business location by the corporation and its 
individual shareholder(s); 
   (13) employment of the same employees or attorney by the corporation and its 
shareholder(s); 
   (14) concealment or misrepresentation of the identity of the ownership, 
management, or financial interests in the corporation, and concealment of personal 
business activities of the shareholders (sole shareholders do not reveal the association 
with a corporation, which makes loans to them without adequate security); 
   (15) disregard of legal formalities and failure to maintain proper arm’s length 
relationships among related entities; 
   (16) use of a corporate entity as a conduit to procure labor, services, or 
merchandise for another person or entity; 
   (17) diversion of corporate assets from the corporation by or to a stockholder or 
other person or entity to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and 
liabilities between entities to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another; 
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   (18) contracting by the corporation with another person with the intent to avoid 
the risk of nonperformance by use of the corporate entity, or use of a corporation as a 
subterfuge for illegal transactions; 
   (19) the formation and use of the corporation to assume the existing liabilities of 
another person or entity.” 
In order to figure out which of these elemental factors will conquer the legitimate 
presumption of upholding the institutional concept of corporate entity, the balancing 
test62 between  economic value on shielding shareholders from personal liability and the 
equitability of piercing shall be taken into consideration.63  
 
Japanese Approach on Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Japanese jurisdiction also grants significant concern on synchronization of 
piercing the veil doctrine「法人格否認の法理」 as well, since after the World War II 
many corporations have been established to serve the flourish of economy, some of them 
were formed with hidden intention to abusively shield the individual shareholders from 
legal enforcement, such as delinquency of taxes.64  The term「法人格否認の法理」 
(houjinkakuhininnohouri or “disregard of the corporate personality doctrine”) was 
initially defined in the paper of Prof. Kenichiro Osumi 「大隅 健一 」in 1950.65 
Equitability and justifiability, as in U.S. jurisdiction, are the main purpose of Japanese 
juridical branches to enforce the piercing scheme.66  
                                          
62“A subjective test with which a court weighs competing interests, e.g. between an inmate's 
liberty interest and the government's interest in public safety, to decide which interest prevails.” See 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/balancing_test.  
63Barber supra note 1.  at 375. 
64西川 勝利  (Katsutoshi Nishikawa),  納 分における法人格否認の法理の適用 ( Application  
of the Doctrine of  Piercing the Corporate Veil in Disposition for Tax Delinquency), publication of 
Hiroshima Taxation Bureau Collection Division, at 353, available at http://www.nta.go.jp/ntc/kenkyu/ 
ronsou/30/224/ronsou.pdf. 
65Id. at 363.  
66田村陽子(Yoko Tamura), 法人格否認の法理に する訴訟法的考察(The Case Studies of 
Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine), Ritsumeikan University Law Journal, at 141-145, available at 
http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/07-4/tamura.pdf. 
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Japanese courts also recognize the establishment of principles concerning piercing 
the corporate veil. An introduction of this legal doctrine to Japan was made by a Supreme 
Court decision of 27 February 196967, stating that "where the legal personality of [a 
company] is nothing more than a mere shell, or where it is misused in order to avoid the 
application of legislation…it will be necessary to pierce the corporate veil."68 
Two main factors for determining whether the corporate personality shall be 
disregarded can be extracted from Supreme Court of Japan’s decision rendered on 
February 27, 1969. These factors are  “(1)  when there  is  intentional  perversion  of the  
corporate personality  or  (2) when  the  corporation  is  the mere  adjunct or  alter  ego  of  
a  shareholder.”  Doctrine of perversion seems to be the fruits of old American  case  law  
or  German  law,  and  the alter ego doctrine shares similarity with  to  "instrumentality  
rule"69  which has influenced the courts ‘discretion in U.S. for decades. As a consequence 
of this  Supreme  Court  decision,  an allowance is granted to many courts on 
disregarding the  corporate  entity  under  such  circumstantial conditions.70 
 
                                          
67http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/corporate/case/02_en.pdf.   
   “X, an owner of the shop in question, entered into a shop lease agreement for a 5 year lease period on 
February 1961 with Y joint-stock company (kabushiki kaisha). Y joint-stock company, which sold 
electrical equipment, etc., even though it was a joint-stock company, was a company organized only for tax 
advantages, and was actually an individually-owned company (kojinkigyo) by A as representative director, 
and therefore X entered into the agreement without recognizing whether its counterparty, an electrical shop, 
was a corporate organization or an individually-owned company and in the end, X entered into the 
agreement with A as an electrical shop. 
Early in 1966,   when X requested that A vacate the shop in question returning the shop to X, A 
delivered a signed promise to the effect that A would vacate the shop by August 19 of the same year. 
However, A had not vacated the shop by that date, and then X filed a lawsuit in court seeking to have A 
vacate the shop, with A as a defendant. During the continuance of this lawsuit, a settlement, to the effect 
that A should vacate and return the shop to X, was reached between X and A at the court’s 
recommendation. However, A claimed that A would not vacate the part of the building used by Y joint-
stock company because the only party to the settlement was A, and X had filed the lawsuit in question 
claiming to vacate the building in question etc., against Y joint-stock company as a defendant.” 
68http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/corporate/index.html. 
69See note 50.  
70Aotake Shoichi, The Close Corporation in Japanese Law, Hokkaido University Law Journal, at 
1886., available at http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/ 2115/16339/1/31(3-4)2_p508-493.pdf. 
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Thai Law and the Settlement of Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine  
Thailand began to adopt piercing the corporate veil, which had been enforced in 
foreign countries’ law, since 1917 A.D. by prescribing it in various acts which are:- 
1)  Trading with the Enemy Act B.E. 2460 (1917 A.D.).  
 This act prohibits any Thai people and foreigners who live in Thailand from 
making any contract or any agreement or having any trading relationship with any alien 
enemy who are German, Austrian and Hungarian which are the war enemy against 
Thailand. This act prohibits any trading no matter direct or indirect trading. Any contract 
which is against this act will be void.71  
 The importance of this act is in section 8 which allows the minister to 
sequestrate and dissolve any business organizations that conduct business with an alien 
enemy. The notable point is that “alien enemy” does not include only natural persons, 
partnerships or corporations but also means members in limited partnerships and 
shareholders in corporations. Therefore, although the corporations is registered in 
Thailand (which means it is Thai corporation), but some or all of the shareholders hold an 
enemy nationality, that corporation are defined as an alien enemy. This rule shows that 
the act disregards the separation of corporate entity concept.72  
2) Act on Confinement and Business or Asset Control of the Enemy of United 
Nations B.E. 2488 (1945 A.D.).  
 The importance is in section 3 which states that if any person, without any 
permission from the government officer, have made any agreement with the person who 
is the enemy of United Nations, that agreement or contract will be void. This act defines 
“the person who is the enemy of the United Nations” as natural person, corporation, 
foundation, general partnership and other organizations with no regard to their 
registration. Moreover, although these organs are  legal entities that are registered under 
Thai law in Thailand but if their business and purpose benefit any person who is the 
enemy of UN (such as some shareholders hold enemy nationality), that legal entity is also 
considered as the enemy of United Nations. Section 7 of this act grants power to the 
                                          
71ChiRaMongkhonPhaNit, supra note 11 at 19.  
72Id. 
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government officer to take over such business and sequestrate all assets and dissolve such 
business.73  
3) Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999 A.D.)  
      This act involves the controlling of foreign business in order to maintain the 
balance of national trade and business power and to benefit the whole nation. This act 
limits foreigners’ rights which affect the structure of shareholding or possessing of such 
business.  
 According to this act, section 4 states that “Foreigner” means:- 
 (1) Natural person not of Thai nationality. 
 (2) Juristic person not registered in Thailand. 
 (3) Juristic person registered in Thailand having the following characteristics. 
      (a) Having half or more of the juristic person's capital shares held by 
persons under (1) or (2) or a juristic person having the persons under (1) or (2) investing 
with a value of half or more of the total capital of the juristic parson. 
  (b) Limited partnership or registered ordinary partnership having the 
person under (1) as the managing partner or manager. 
 (4) Juristic person registered in Thailand having half or more of its capital 
shares held by the person under (1), (2) or (3), or a juristic person having the persons 
under (1), (2) or (3) investing with the value of half or more of its total capital. 
For the purpose of the definition, the shares of a limited company represented by 
share certificates that are issued to bearers shall be deemed as the shares of foreigners 
unless otherwise provided by ministerial regulations. 
This rule shows that this act applies piercing the corporate veil doctrine by 
defining the legal entity, although registered under Thai law, as a foreigner if such legal 
entity contains majority of foreign shareholders because they can control the whole 
business which means they are the same entity as corporation or partnership.74 
4) Land Code  
      Land Code limits the title of land possession of foreign legal entity (natural 
and juristic person).  
                                          
73Id. at 20.  
74Id. at 21. 
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     Section 97 states that the following juristic persons have the same title in land 
as a foreigner.:- 
 (1) Corporations that contains the amount of foreign capital more than 49% or 
contains foreign shareholders more than a half.  
 Additionally, if such corporation issue bearer bonds, that bonds it shall be 
deemed that foreigners hold that bonds.75 
 Section 98 states that in case that the juristic persons in accordance with 
section 97 capitalized or become shareholders or partnerships in other juristic persons in 
the way of section 97, such juristic person shall be deemed as foreigners. 
 Section 86 states that for foreigners, in order to obtain any land for purpose of 
living, commerce, industry, agriculture, cemetery, donation or religion, it is under 
condition and rule regulated by ministerial regulation and minister permission. 
 From the aforementioned rule, foreigners have limited rights in possessing 
land which are different from natural or juristic persons with Thai nationality. Therefore, 
somebody may try to circumvent the law by establishing a corporation to possess the land 
instead of them. Consequently, piercing the veil doctrine will be applied in this situation. 
This doctrine will deem such corporation as a foreigner which is manipulated by foreign 
natural persons since they are major shareholders and control the majority of the business 
that make the corporation become the same entity as foreign shareholders.76  
5) Commercial Banking Act, B.E. 2505 (A.D. 1962). 
 This act has applied piercing the corporate veil doctrine in the following:- 
 Section 5 Bis states that no person shall hold more than five percent ff the 
total amount of a commercial bank’s share sold…. 
 Shares of a commercial bank held by the following persons or partnerships 
shall be regarded as shares held by the person under the first paragraph: 
(1) the spouse of the person under the first paragraph; 
(2) a minor child of the person under the first paragraph; 
(3) an ordinary partnership in which the person under the first paragraph or 
the person under (1) or (2) is a partner; 
                                          
75Id. 
76Id. 
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(4) a limited partnership in which the person under the first paragraph of the 
person under (1) or (2) is a partner with unlimited liability or in which one 
or more of such person is a partner or are partners with limited liability in 
a aggregate amount exceeding thirty percent of the total capital of such 
limited partnership; 
(5) a limited company in which the person under the paragraph or the person 
under (1) or (2) or the partnership under (3) or (4) holds shares, separately 
or in combination, in an aggregate amount exceeding thirty percent of the 
total amount of such limited company’s shares sold; or 
(6) a limited company in which the person under the first paragraph or the 
person under (1) or (2) or the partnership under (3) or (4) or the limited 
company under (5) holds shared, separately or in combination, in an 
aggregate amount exceeding thirty percent of the total amount of such 
limited company’s shares sold.77  
The above rules illustrate implication of piercing the corporate veil doctrine in the 
way that they deem the corporation which is settled by natural person in order to hold 
shares in a commercial bank with purpose to circumvent section 5 Bis by holding more 
than 30 percent of the shares in such corporation. Therefore, they have major control in 
the corporation. Consequently, the law defines the shares that are held by such 
corporation as the shares of natural person who is the shareholder of the commercial 
bank, then it is against the law to hold more than 5 percent of the commercial bank’s 
shares.  
Additionally, section 12 states that no commercial bank shall: 
(2) in favor of its director, grant credits, guarantee any debts, or accept, gives aval 
to, or intervene for honor of any bills which the director is a drawer, a maker or an 
endorser,  
Section 12 Bis states that the granting of credits or guaranteeing of any debt in 
favor of any of the following persons or partnerships, or the accepting of any bill, the 
giving of aval to or the intervening for honor of any bill which any of the following 
persons or partnerships is a drawer, maker or an endorser shall be deemed to be the 
                                          
77Id. 
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granting of credits or guaranteeing of any debt or the accepting, the giving of aval or the 
intervening for honor for the benefit of the director under Section 12 (2): 
(1) the spouse of the director; 
(2) a minor child of the director; 
(3) an ordinary partnership in which the director or the person under (1) or 
(2) is a partner; 
  (4) a limited partnership in which the director or the person under (1) or 
(2) is a partner with unlimited liability or in which one or more of such persons in a 
partner or are partners with limited liability in an aggregate amount exceeding thirty 
percent of the total capital of such limited partnership; 
(5) a limited company in which the director or the person under (1) or (2) 
or the partnership under (3) or (4) holds shares, separately or in combination, in an 
aggregate amount exceeding thirty percent of the total amount of such limited company’s 
share sold; or 
(6) a limited company in which the director or the person under (1) or (2) 
or the partnership under (3) or (4) or the limited company under (5) holds shares, 
separately or in combination, in an aggregate amount exceeding thirty percent of the total 
amount of such limited company’s shares sold. 
According to section 12, there is a feature of enforcing piercing the corporate veil 
doctrine to define the liability of shareholders or directors and/or family members of 
shareholders or directors of corporations who hold shares more than 30 percent (can 
control the corporation) by deeming that the granting of credit to the director of the 
corporation who is the major shareholder of such corporation is equal to granting the 
credits to the director of the commercial bank which are prohibited by law.78  
6) Thai Revenue Code  
Thai revenue code have adopted the piercing the corporate veil doctrine to benefit 
the government in collecting tax, for example,: 
Section 77 which was amended by 11th revenue code amendment act B.E. 2525 in 
order to fill the gap of the law to prevent abusive corporate veiling. It provides the 
definition of the word “produce” to mean “agriculture doing, natural resource mining, 
                                          
78Id. at 23.  
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good transforming,….no matter such businesses are committed by the tax payer himself 
or by others who have agreement with the tax payer to do such business. 
The reason of the parliament on this enactment is that it wants to collect tax as 
much as it can. In the past, troubles occurred when some companies tried to evade the tax 
by making a contract with another company to produce the goods in their orders and sell 
it to the former one as they wanted. The latter company would be forced by the former 
one to stamp the emblem of trademark of the former company while the former company 
was the one who provide packaging, quality standard features, color and ingredients of all 
products to the latter. Moreover, there was an agreement between two of them that the 
latter company could not produce those goods to other companies.  
The Thai Revenue Department then filed a law suit to that company to collect the 
tax as “producer” rate (which is higher than the “purchaser” rate). However, the court 
decided that the former company was the purchaser not the producer because it did not 
transform the goods it bought from the latter company into the new goods, therefore it 
was not defined as “producing” according to the definition given in Revenue Code 
section 77.79  
Accordingly, due to the amended law, any person or company cannot decrease tax 
burden by using the above method and have to be liable for the high tax rate as a 
producer.80   
Additionally, piercing the corporate veil is not applied only in the legislative acts; 
it is also applied in the court decision.  
The Thai courts will use piercing the corporate veil doctrine by using section 5 of 
Civil and Commercial Code which states that “Everyone must, in the exercise of his 
rights and the performance of his obligations, act in good faith.”81 Often, courts use these 
two elements: 
 
 
 
 
                                          
79Id.  
80Id. 
81Pramuan Kotmaiphaeng Lae Phanit [Civil and Commercial Code] § 5. 
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1. Alter ego 
    The situation when a corporation is just an instrument of shareholders. The 
assets of corporations are like the assets of shareholders and not enough to run a 
corporation’s business.82  
    Additionally, when the corporation is dominated by only some amount of 
shareholders, it can be said that such corporation is just a “sham” of the shareholders. In 
addition, in case that the parent corporation dominates and controls all of their 
subsidiaries which all of their shares are held by the parent corporation. These acts may 
leads to equitability of the courts to apply piercing the corporate veil doctrine.83  
2. Fraud or Bad Faith act shall be proven. 
    The courts may enforce piercing the corporate veil doctrine when there is an 
occurrence of unfaithful act, beside alter ego, for example: 
1. Shareholders or directors of the corporation run the pierced corporate as a 
puppet. 
2. Shareholders use their personal assets confound with those of the 
corporation. 
3. Using the corporation to corruptly seek for their own personal benefit or 
transferring the corporation’s asset to themselves. 
4. Running the business of the corporation as a personal business or publicly 
show that the business of the corporation is not separated from personal 
business. 
5. Fraudulent, dishonest or unlawful acts occur. 
6. Using the corporation to evade the law, debts or liability. 
7. The corporation has so low capital that is not enough for expected liability 
in future that can occur from running the business.  
Therefore, when these circumstances occur, Thai courts may use piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine as much as they can to maintain equity in society.84  
 
 
                                          
82ChiRaMongkhonPhaNit, supra note 11 at 28. 
83Id. 
84Id. at 28. 
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Epilogue 
In sum, from all of the discussions above, it is quite obvious that piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine appears in many countries’ law such as United States and Japan. 
Thailand adopted this doctrinal framework since B.E. 2460 (1917 A.D.) in Trading with 
the Enemy Act and in the court decisions. However, the codification of this doctrine has 
not been obvious yet in either Thai law, Japanese law or U.S. law. 
Considering from the existed problems in Thailand, the court will hold the 
defendant to be liable with his corporation in the debts of the corporation if that person 
corruptly used the “separate legal entity concept”. Moreover, that person used the 
corporate decisively as the veil to evade his contractual obligation. 
Some scholars said that from the Thai Supreme Court decisions as a guideline,85 
the courts have applied section 5 of Civil and Commercial Code86 as a vehicle leading to 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine as “Good Faith” doctrine87 Therefore, there is no 
necessity to codify piercing the corporate veil doctrine.88  
However, law amendment and codification should be taken into account in order to 
decrease the amount of using the corporation as a veil from limited liability concept. The 
amendment should be aimed to define an exception of limited liability or separate legal entity 
of the corporation. This can lead to more effective ways to fix the problems, prevent and define 
the liability of the person who abusively uses the limited liability doctrine. For Thailand, 
arranging piercing the corporate veil doctrine in form of an exception in some specific law may 
not be the most optimized way to serve justice because in order to solve the problems regarding 
abusive application of limited liability rule, amendment of all of relevant specific laws is 
required, which consumes lots of time and budget. 
Therefore, if amendment of the law which make piercing the corporate veil become 
more broadly used is plausible, it should be arranged in Civil and Commercial Code, Title 22: 
Partnership and Companies as an exception of limited liability doctrine in section 1015, 1096. 
This will solve the troubles arising from using the limited liability as a veil in every 
                                          
85Please note that in Civil Law system, cases are not the source of the law. However, the courts 
often use precedent cases as a guideline of the way to interpret the text in the code.  
86TCCC Section 5: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his 
obligations, act in good faith.” 
87ChiRaMongkhonPhaNit, supra note 11 at 29. 
88The sources of the law in Civil Law system are only codes, statutes and regulations.  
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circumstance and can be applied in every type of corporations. Moreover, codification of 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine will enhance clarity and righteousness for the judicial 
branch to untie the legal, instead of an arm-length enforcement from section 5 of TCCC.     
The guideline of the amendment may state that “In case that a corporations is 
unfaithfully run; with an intention to fraud or deceive its creditors or innocent third party 
or try to evade the liability or law enforcement, shareholders, directors or officers who 
are the conspirers of such act, shall be unlimitedly liable for the all debts of the 
corporation together with the corporation. 
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